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INTRODUCTION 
Social gatherings that began as innocuous mass pillow fights in 
parks or choreographed break-dancing in local shopping malls are 
now raising serious First Amendment questions. A ubiquitous 
international phenomenon known as the ―flash mob‖ debuted in 
2003.
1
  At the start, ―[a] group of people would arrange to meet in 
a public place at a particular time and would perform a song or a 
dance number or some other form of entertainment very suddenly 
and without warning.‖2  In recent months, however, ―the term 
‗flash mob‘ has rapidly come to mean something else.‖3  People 
are ―using social media and other forms of communication to 
coordinate shocking large scale crimes‖ such as robberies,4 that 
often result in serious violence.  Sometimes these groups are 
involved in mass shoplifting or looting, and are even ―committing 
random acts of violence.‖5  Young people have convened to 
―attack people both in public but also on private property, acts 
which have resulted in serious physical and psychological trauma, 
and even murder.‖6  These mobs have been ―organized through 
 
 1 Alexander Baron, Op-Ed., The Man Who Monitors Violent Flash Mobs, DIGITAL 
JOURNAL (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/311622. 
 2 Flash Mob Epidemic, AM. DREAM (Aug. 16, 2011), http://endoftheamerican 
dream.com/archives/flash-mob-epidemic. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Baron, supra note 1; see also Ian Urbina, Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text 
Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html.  The New York Times reported a particularly bad flash 
mob incident in Philadelphia, noting that the teenagers involved participated in ―a ritual 
that is part bullying, part running of the bulls: sprinting down the block, the teenagers 
sometimes pause to brawl with one another, assault pedestrians or vandalize property.‖  
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technological means–either on social media networks like 
Facebook and Twitter, or through text message or email.‖ 7 
Regulatory responses to this electronically orchestrated 
violence have varied.
8
  While the violent criminal acts themselves 
are clearly punishable, what remains unclear is how to legally 
penalize digital speech—tweets, alerts, Facebook status updates— 
that brings about the mobs in the first place.  Following a violent 
flash mob incident at a town fair this summer, the city of 
Cleveland passed a law intended to bar ―improper use of social 
media to violate ordinances on disorderly conduct, public 
intoxication and unlawful congregation by promoting illegal flash 
mob activity.‖9  This issue has also arisen in England: following a 
rampage of criminal conduct in London and other English cities, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron said he was considering 
legislation to ―stop people communicating via these websites . . . 
when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and 
criminality.‖10 
Quelling such violence is a desirable goal, but criminalizing the 
speech that leads to it may amount to a First Amendment violation.  
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,
11
 the Supreme Court developed the 
current test for when the government may proscribe advocacy 
speech, ruling that ―constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.‖12  Laws criminalizing 
speech that incites flash mobs must thus be analyzed through the 
Brandenburg lens. 
 
 7 What are Flash Mobs?, INT‘L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
articles/212400/20110912/flash-mob-what-are-flash-mobs-haka.htm. 
 8 See, e.g., id. (discussing Cleveland‘s city council decision to ban the use of cell 
phones to start a flash mob); Urbina, supra note 6 (explaining that Philadelphia is seeking 
assistance from the FBI to monitor electronic prompts).  
 9 Floyd Abrams, Flash Mob Violence and the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119045832045765445310394095 
22.html 
 10 Id. 
 11 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 12 Id. at 447. 
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Lyle Denniston, a National Constitution Center adviser, 
indicated that ―decisions such as Brandenburg . . . have set the bar 
pretty high.‖13  He has stated, ―[a] Twitter or Facebook 
message . . . would have to say, ‗We will meet at Broad and 
Market Street tomorrow at 10:30 and begin an assault on City Hall. 
Bring your Uzis.‘ If it‘s not that explicit or direct, it would be very 
difficult to argue for regulation.‖14  If challenged, laws like the 
Cleveland Ordinance would be unlikely to pass constitutional 
muster due to facial vagueness, and would likely fail the 
Brandenburg analysis.  The Cleveland Ordinance is vague with 
regard to ―who would be open to prosecution or how police would 
determine whether social media caused‖ the criminal activity.15 It 
is, nevertheless, possible for state and local governments to enact 
valid laws with the goal of deterring the violent acts that are often 
increasingly the result of flash mobs, without disturbing the 
Court‘s speech-protective holding in Brandenburg, if the test is 
applied flexibly. 
This Note will argue that content-based laws designed to 
punish organizers of criminal flash mobs will best serve the 
compelling goals of state and local governments to deter crime and 
violence.  Part I reviews the origin of flash mobs and the current 
use of social media as a platform for organizing criminal activity.  
It then discusses the Supreme Court decisions that led to 
Brandenburg, as well as the Court‘s development of the doctrines 
of vagueness and overbreadth, content neutrality, viewpoint 
neutrality, and time, place, or manner restrictions.  Part II presents 
two approaches to regulating violent flash mobs: implementing 
laws that criminalize the speech that leads to flash mobs, and 
content-neutral, time, place, or manner laws aimed at deterring 
local violence.  Part III demonstrates that, by enacting narrowly-
tailored content-based ordinances, it is possible for state and city 
governments to enact constitutional laws that will punish and deter 
 
 13 John Timpane, Flash-Mob Violence Raises Weighty Questions, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Aug. 14, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-14/news/29886718_1_social-media-
flash-mob-facebook-and-other-services. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Vince Grzegorek, Cleveland‟s „Flash Mob‟ Law Fuzzy, Maybe Illegal, SCENE MAG. 
(Jul. 26, 2011), http://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2011/07/26/ 
clevelands-flash-mob-law-fuzzy-maybe-illegal. 
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highly dangerous initiations of flash mobs without disturbing 
Brandenburg‘s safeguard against chilling free speech.  Part III also 
proposes a model flash mob speech ordinance. 
I. BACKGROUND: FLASH MOBS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 Before evaluating the viability of content-based and content-
neutral flash mob laws, it is necessary to explore the history of 
flash mobs and the recent violent and criminal activity associated 
with them, and to briefly review First Amendment speech 
jurisprudence, including the application of the Brandenburg test 
and intermediate scrutiny. 
A. Flash Mob Speech 
1. What Are Flash Mobs and How Are They Started? 
As defined by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary in 2004, 
a flash mob is ―a sudden mass gathering, unanticipated except by 
participants who communicate electronically.‖16  Flash mobs are 
generally organized through technological means.
17
  Participants 
are told when and where to meet, and because they almost always 
use mobile devices to get in touch with each other, meeting places 
and times can change instantly and frequently.  From the 
perspective of a bystander, ―flash mobs appear suddenly and 
without warning.‖18  Contrary to their peaceful and humorous 
origins, flash mobs have ―taken a darker twist as criminals exploit 
the anonymity of crowds, using social networking to coordinate 
everything from robberies to fights to general chaos.‖19  Flash 
 
 16 Flash Mob Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/flash+mob?region=us (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 17 See What are Flash Mobs?, supra note 7. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Eric Tucker & Thomas Watkins, More Flash Mobs Gather with Criminal Intent, 
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44077826/ns/technology 
_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/more-flash-mobs-gather-criminal-intent/#.TsL4-
2ASMU4. 
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mobs have recently been used during riots in England and street 
protests in the Middle East.
20
 
The first known flash mob took place in New York City on 
June 17, 2003.
21
  The phenomenon‘s supposed creator is a man 
named Bill Wasik, who incited the mob by e-mailing 
approximately fifty people and asking them to gather at a store in 
downtown Manhattan.
22
  When the store found out, Wasik 
canceled the initial mob but summoned the crowd for a second 
attempt.
23
  After participants were instructed by ―text messages, 
emails and blog banter, a crowd of approximately 100 people 
gathered in the home furnishing section of Macy‘s department 
store‖ and stood around a $10,000 rug.24  As instructed by Wasik, 
the participants told salespeople that they all ―lived together in a 
free-love commune and that they wanted to purchase a ‗love 
rug.‘‖25  According to those who observed the incident, ―the mob 
dispersed rapidly after spending ten minutes discussing the rug 
among themselves and with salespeople.‖26  
 Another early Manhattan flash mob involved hundreds of 
people perched on a stone ledge in Central Park making bird 
noises.
27
  Large cities around the world quickly adopted the trend 
and hosted their own unique flash mobs.
28
  On July 24 in Rome, 
―over 300 flash mobbers invaded a music and bookstore . . . spent 
several minutes asking employees for nonexistent books before 
applauding and dispersing.‖29  In 2003 in Vancouver, Canada, ―35 
 
 20 Scott McCabe, Flash Mobs Started as Playful Experiment, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 
15, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/2011/08/flash-mobs-started-playful-
experiment#ixzz1dovgWbqA. 
 21 Judith A. Nicholson, Flash! Mobs in the Age of Mobile Connectivity, 6 
FIBRECULTURE (2005), http://www.fibreculture.org/journal/issue6/issue6_nicholson.html. 
 22 See McCabe, supra note 20.  
 23 See Nicholson, supra note 21.  
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Amy Harmon, Ideas & Trends: Flash Mobs; Guess Some People Don‟t Have 
Anything Better to Do, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08 
/17/weekinreview/ideas-trends-flash-mobs-guess-some-people-don-t-have-anything-
better-to-do.html.   
 28 See Nicholson, supra note 21. 
 29 Id. 
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people met up . . . at a major intersection and did the twist, to 
shouts and countershouts of ―Chubby!‖ and ―Checker!‘‘ . . . 
[S]everal minutes later, the dancing halted and the flash mobbers 
dispersed into the crowd of spectators that had gathered.‖30 
2. Violent Flash Mobs in Current Events 
Recent years have seen the rise of violent, malevolent ―flash 
robs‖ in many cities across the United States and abroad.31  Four 
examples of recent criminal flash mobs occurred in Cleveland, 
Philadelphia, suburbs of Maryland, and San Francisco. 
a) Cleveland 
Cleveland Heights police were called to the Coventry Street 
Arts Festival in June 2011, after approximately 1500 flash mobbers 
―began rampaging, running, fighting, screaming, and yelling.‖32  
The flash mob resulted in the arrests of fifteen mob participants for 
felony aggravated riot.
33
  On July 4, 2011, Shaker Heights police 
faced similar circumstances when several fights involving 
hundreds of teenagers erupted at the city‘s Independence Day 
fireworks display.
34
  The nearly-1000 teenagers who turned up to 
the event to fight are believed to have mobilized through social 
networking sites.
35
 
In August 2011, Cleveland rapper ―Machine Gun Kelly‖ was 
arrested after attempting to incite a flash mob at South Park Mall.
36
  
 
 30 Id. 
 31 See David Downs, The evolution of flash mobs from pranks to crime and revolution, 
EXAMINER (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/08/evolution-flash-
mobs-pranks-crime-and-revolution#ixzz1e5NkdAgX. 
 32 Robert O‘Brien, Violent Flash Mobs: Passing Fad or Here to Stay?, POLICE MAG. 
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/Blog/SWAT/Story/2011/08/Violent-Flash-
Mobs-Passing-Fad-or-Here-to-Stay.aspx. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
35     Associated Press, Cleveland Flash Mob Fight Gathers Attention, CHRONICLE ONLINE 
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://chronicle.northcoastnow.com/2011/08/09/cleveland-flash-mob-
fight-gathers-attention/. 
 36 Adam Rathe, Machine Gun Kelly Arrested: Rapper Busted for Inciting Flash Mob in 
Cleveland Mall via Twitter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-22/gossip/29936931_1_flash-mob-mall-
management-bad-boy-records. 
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The entertainer took to his Twitter account around 2:00 p.m. the 
day of the mob and posted the following tweet: ―Today we flash 
mob NO MATTER WHAT! 5pm at SouthPark [sic] mall in the 
foodcourt, [sic] wear disguises, dont move to [sic] you hear 
‗Cleveland‘ play then RAGE!‖37  Many fans heeded the rapper‘s 
call and ―raged‖ at the mall.38  Although he was asked by the 
police department to refrain from standing on a table, Kelly did it 
anyway.
39
  Kelly was charged with disorderly conduct for his 
actions at the mall, but not for inciting the mob. 
40
 
b) Philadelphia 
Philadelphia‘s flash mob problems began in the summer of 
2009, and took a turn for the worse when thousands crowded the 
South Street area on a March 2010 weekend, leading to injuries 
and vandalism.
41
  The Philadelphia police, tipped off by ―some 
alert and responsible parents,‖ thwarted a potential flash mob riot 
on South Street.
42
  The teens, organized through Twitter, 
descended on South Street around 9:00 p.m.
43
  A witness to the 
incident recalled: ―[t]here was a crowd of people all running . . . on 
both sides of the street and in the street.  Not really listening to the 
cops, who were trying to control everyone.  And everyone was 
angry and yelling.‖44  The police needed reinforcements to control 
the mob.
45
  Multiple fights broke out, and police made several 
arrests.
46
  By midnight, the police had prevailed and the mob 
dispersed.
47
  During the episode, ―businesses on South Street 
locked their doors, trying to keep their legitimate customers 
 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Machine Gun Kelly Arrested After Inciting Flash Mob, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/21/machine-gun-kelly-arrested_n_ 
932390.html. 
 41 Vernon Odom, Police Contain Flash Mob on South Street, 6ABC.COM (Mar. 22, 
2010), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=7341962. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
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safe.‖48  One Philadelphia resident explained that the retailers ―had 
to lock their doors because their patrons were afraid to leave.‖49 
In February 2010 on a weekday afternoon in Center City, ―[a]s 
many as 100 teens from three area high schools descended upon 
The Gallery at Market East.‖50  When mall security quickly tried to 
remove the teens, the crowd split up and became chaotic.
51
  The 
groups swarmed Market Street approaching City Hall, with ―some 
starting a large snowball fight on the building‘s grounds while 
others began fighting on street corners.‖52  On their way to City 
Hall, ―the teens darted through traffic and knocked strangers to the 
ground.‖53  Some of the teens entered a Macy‘s department store, 
where they damaged store property and stole clothing.
54
  One 
witness estimated that between forty and fifty kids ransacked the 
store.
55
  During the altercation, one teenage victim was kicked in 
the head and taken to the hospital with head injuries.
56
  The 
authorities believed that the incident had been coordinated using 
Facebook or Twitter.
57
 
On July 29, 2011, another incident occurred where 
approximately thirty teenagers gathered near City Hall and 
severely beat two people, leaving one unconscious and the other 
with a badly broken jaw.
58
 
c) Montgomery County and Silver Spring, Maryland 
In August 2011, more than two-dozen teenagers rushed into a 
7-Eleven convenience store in Germantown, Maryland ―and stole 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Vince Lattanzio, Teen Mob Attack in Center City, NBC 10 PHILA. (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Huge-City-Hall-Snowball-Fight-Lands-
Teens-in-Jail-84517507.html. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Daniel Tovrov, Will Philadelphia‟s Flash Mob Curfew be Effective?, INT‘L BUS. 
TIMES, (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/198282/20110815/philadelphia-
flash-mob-2011-curfew-michael-nutter.htm. 
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snacks, drinks and other items.‖59  Like the violence in Center 
City, Philadelphia, Germantown police also suspected that 
Facebook and Twitter, or perhaps other social media, had been 
used to organize the mob.
60
  Starks, a spokesman for the 
Germantown police force said, ―the store clerk pressed the silent 
alarm when he belatedly realized there was a robbery in progress, 
and a police cruiser responded in under a minute.  But by then, the 
mob was gone.‖61 
A near-identical incident took place in Silver Spring in 
November 2011, when fifty teenagers stormed a 7-Eleven at 
around 11:20 p.m. on a Saturday night.
62
  The teens stole drinks 
and snacks and fled the scene before police arrived.
63
 
d) San Francisco 
In the San Francisco Bay Area, Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) security has recently encountered mob behavior like never 
before.
64
  According to BART spokesman Linton Johnson, ―[t]he 
difference between 10 years ago and now is massive . . .  
[t]echnology has just made it easier to organize faster.‖65  In 
August 2011, Johnson received word that a group had organized 
under ―instructions to carry masks, wear black and converge en 
masse to foment chaos at specific times and places‖ with the intent 
to disrupt BART train service as a form of protest.
66
  BART 
security responded by shutting off its underground cell phone 
service.
67
 
 
 59 Edecio Martinez, Flash Mob Robs Maryland 7-Eleven, CBS NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20092862-504083.html. 
 60 Jack Cloherty, Flash Mob Loots 7-11 Store in Germantown, Maryland, ABC NEWS 
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/flash-mob-turns-felony-germantown/ 
story?id=14316655#.TsW6-2ASMU4. The incident was caught on security cameras and 
the frightening video can be seen at the link. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Police Investigate Silver Spring 7-Eleven Mass Theft, ABC2NEWS.COM (Nov. 21, 
2011), http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/police-investigate-silver-spring-7-eleven-
mass-theft. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Downs, supra note 31. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. 
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B. The Difficulty of Preventing and Controlling Flash Mobs 
Violent and criminal flash mobs are on the rise in American 
cities.  The mobs are particularly hard for police to control because 
of their secretive, spontaneous and fleeting nature. 
Criminal flash mobs are an increasingly common threat to the 
police force and to society. The increasing violent flash mob 
problems have been described as ―waves of rampaging flash mobs 
running, stealing, assaulting, and robbing innocent people and 
businesses.‖68  Dangerous ―flash robs‖ show no sign of slowing 
down in the near future.  The New York-based brokerage unit of 
Marsh & McLennan noted that ―thieves that take advantage of 
flash mob techniques to organize and overwhelm stores present a 
risk during the holiday shopping season.‖69  Marsh noted that ten 
percent of retailers surveyed by the National Retail Federation in 
the summer of 2011 reported ―being victimized by at least one 
criminal flash mob event over the previous 12 months.‖70  Those 
mobs often resulted in ―injuries to customers or employees, theft 
and property damage.‖71 
Moreover, flash mobs are spontaneous, anonymous, and 
difficult to stop.  Marsh further stated, ―using social media, 
criminals can direct large groups of individuals to specific 
locations to disrupt business and traffic, with the chaos that 
sometimes results escalating to a level that can‘t be controlled by 
loss prevention, mall security or police.‖72  Joe La Rocca, 
spokesperson for the National Retail Federation, said that ―[t]hese 
incidents can turn violent, they can injure customers, they can 
damage the store and then there‘s the financial losses the retailers 
suffer.‖73  In most cases of this sort, ―by the time the police arrive, 
 
 68 O‘Brien, supra note 32, at 1.       
 69 Rodd Zolkos, Flash Mobs Pose Threat to Retailers: Marsh, 
BUSINESSINSURANCE.COM (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.businessinsurance.com 
/article/20111117/NEWS06/111119902?tags=%7C59%7C338%7C69%7C71%7C340%7
C302%7C83.   
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Cloherty, supra note 60, at 1.  
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the mob is long gone, making for a long arduous process to 
identify and prosecute the culprits.‖74 
C. History of Constitutional Speech Protection in the United 
States 
 Before examining the First Amendment issues presented by 
violent flash mobs and related laws, it is necessary to review the 
history of the Supreme Court‘s application of the First Amendment 
in speech cases, and to examine the background principles that 
govern laws that allegedly violate the First Amendment.  Speech 
that organizes flash mobs falls under the category of ―incitement 
speech‖ and laws that purport to regulate that speech must be 
evaluated under the speech-protective Brandenburg test.
75
  Laws 
that regulate only the time, place or manner of activity are 
evaluated under a less-stringent intermediate scrutiny analysis; that 
is, they will be permitted if they serve a ―substantial‖ or 
―significant‖ governmental interest, and leave open ―ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.‖76 
1. The Boundaries of First Amendment Protections 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress 
of grievances.‖77  The First Amendment‘s guarantees of freedom 
of speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition are among ―the 
most cherished‖ fundamental rights of Americans.78 
 
 74 See id. 
 75 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 999 
(3rd ed. 2006). 
 76 See id. at 1131. 
 77 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 78 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1 (3d ed. 
1996). 
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2. Protecting Speech and the Development of the ―Clear and 
Present Danger‖ Test 
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment speech 
concerns in Schenck v. United States,
79
 demonstrating a very weak 
level of speech protection.
80
  Schenck, a Socialist Party official, 
distributed a leaflet opposing United States participation in World 
War I and was indicted under the Espionage Act for conspiracy to 
cause insubordination in the armed forces and to obstruct the 
recruitment and enlistment of soldiers.
81
  In upholding Schenck‘s 
conviction, Justice Holmes articulated what would later become 
the ―clear and present danger‖ test, stating that the ―question in 
every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.‖82  The Court found that 
Schenck‘s leaflet created a clear and present danger, placing it 
outside of the First Amendment‘s protective coverage.83  It is 
important to note the low shield of political speech depicted in 
Schenck.  The leaflet at issue merely advocated that citizens 
exercise their right to assert opposition to the draft, and did not call 
for any violence, yet still, the Court found no First Amendment 
protection.
84
  
The following week, the Court confirmed Schenck‘s low level 
of speech protection in Debs v. United States.
85
  Like Schenck, 
Debs was a Socialist Party leader convicted under the Espionage 
Act.
86
  His crime was a speech made to an audience at a Socialist 
Party convention, which predicted the ultimate success of 
Socialism.
87
  Referring to the ultra-low level of protection afforded 
in the opinion, American legal scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. referred to 
the Debs decision as ―a low point in the Court‘s performance in 
 
 79 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  
 80 See id.  
 81 See id. at 48–49.  
 82 Id. at 52.  Justice Holmes concluded that ―[i]t is a question of proximity and degree.‖ 
 83 See id. at 52.  
 84 See id. at 51–53. 
 85 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 86 See id. at 212.  
 87 See id. at 212–16. 
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speech cases.‖88  Subsequent to its decisions in Schenck and Debs, 
the Supreme Court continued to affirm similar convictions under 
the Espionage Act.  In Abrams v. United States,
89
 the Court upheld 
the convictions of two defendants who distributed leaflets 
denouncing the American participation in the Russian revolution.
90
  
Interestingly, however, in his dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes 
(who authored the majority opinions in Schenck and Debs) 
advocated for a more stringent application of the ―clear and present 
danger‖ test, finding that neither the danger nor the intent prong 
was met in Abrams.
91
 
The Court briefly retreated from the application of the ―clear 
and present danger‖ test in the mid-1920s in its decisions in Gitlow 
v. New York
92
 and Whitney v. California.
93
  In Gitlow, the Court 
upheld the conviction of members of the Socialist Party for their 
publication of the Left Wing Manifesto under a New York state 
statute criminalizing the advocacy of anarchy.
94
  The Court found 
the statute to be constitutionally valid pursuant to a state‘s right to 
―punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized 
government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.‖95  
Justice Holmes again dissented, advocating for application of the 
―clear and present danger‖ test and finding that the published 
manifesto was a non-threatening statement of political theory.
96
 
Similarly, in Whitney, the Court upheld the conviction of a 
Communist Labor Party member for violating the California 
Criminal Syndicalism Act.
97
  Anita Whitney was charged with 
helping to establish a group devoted to advocating for the 
 
 88 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 136 (1988) (―[I]f Eugene Debs can be 
sent to jail for a public speech, what, if anything, can the ordinary man safely say against 
the war?‖). 
 89 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 90 See id.  
 91 See id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (―It is only the present danger of immediate 
evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the 
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.‖). 
 92 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 93 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 94 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655, 670. 
 95 Id. at 667. 
 96 Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 97 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359, 371.   
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overthrow of the United States government.
98
  Upholding Gitlow, 
the Court held that California had the power to punish those who 
abuse their rights to speech ―by utterances inimical to the public 
welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or 
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its 
overthrow by unlawful means.‖99 
a) Dennis v. United States and the Solidification of ―Clear 
and Present Danger‖ 
During the 1930s and 1940s, the Court re-embraced the ―clear 
and present danger‖ standard.  In Dennis v. United States,100 the 
majority affirmed the convictions of Communist Party organizers 
under the Smith Act.
101
  A plurality applied Justice Hand‘s 
interpretation of the ―clear and present danger‖ test, formulated in 
the lower court: ―‗In each case courts must ask whether the gravity 
of the ‗evil,‘ discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.‘‖102  
The Court found that Dennis‘s advocacy of communist ideas 
constituted a clear and present danger threatening the existence of 
the United States government.
103
 
b) Brandenburg v. Ohio and the Per Se Constitutionality 
of Advocacy Speech 
The Court decidedly repudiated the ―clear and present danger‖ 
test in its 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.
104
  Clarence 
Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, organized a 
filmed rally that showed several men in robes and hoods, some 
carrying firearms, first burning a cross and then making 
speeches.
105
  One of the speeches referred to the possibility of 
taking ―revengeance‖ against niggers, Jews, and those who 
 
 98 See id. at 359–63.  
 99 Id. at 371. 
 100 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 101 See id. at 516–17. 
 102 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
 103 See id. at 516–17.  
 104 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 105 See id. at 445–46.  
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supported them.
106
  Another speech proclaimed that, if ―our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress 
the white, Caucasian race,‖ then a march on Washington would 
take place on the Fourth of July.
107
  Brandenburg was charged with 
advocating violence under Ohio‘s criminal syndicalism statute for 
his participation in the rally and his speech.
108
  In relevant part, the 
statute prohibited ―advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or 
propriety of violence as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform‖ and ―voluntarily assembl[ing] with a group 
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal 
syndicalism.‖109  The Court held that the law proscribed the 
advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not 
that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless 
action.
110
  The failure to make this distinction rendered the law 
overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.
111
  The Court 
reversed Brandenburg‘s conviction, holding that the government 
cannot punish ―mere abstract‖ advocacy of force or violation of the 
law.
112
 
In its per curiam opinion, the Court declined to apply the ―clear 
and present danger‖ test, using instead the language ―imminent 
lawless action‖ to articulate a new test.113  In drawing the line of 
constitutional censorship to cover only speech that ―is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action,‖ Brandenburg completely abrogated 
Whitney‟s central holding.114  The Court held that ―mere advocacy‖ 
of any principle or ideology, including one that assumed the 
necessity of violence or illegal action, was per se constitutionally 
protected speech.
115
  The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the 
 
 106 See id. at 446–47. 
 107 Id. at 446. 
 108 See id. at 444–45. 
 109 Id. at 448 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29231.13 (West 2012)). 
 110 See id. at 448–49.  
 111 See id. at 447–49.  
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. at 447. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id. at 448–49; see also Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). 
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Brandenburg decision as having established an inherent right to 
advocate lawlessness.
116
 
The Brandenburg test is comprised of three distinct elements: 
intent, imminence, and likelihood.
117
  It is now necessary for the 
government to consider not only the presence of a danger, but also 
the proximity of the danger to the speaker‘s intent to provoke that 
danger.
118
  The test is more speech-protective than the ―clear and 
present danger‖ test, making it difficult for states to proscribe 
advocacy speech in most instances.  However, it is still not entirely 
clear if ―imminence‖ requires immediacy in the context of First 
Amendment speech.
119
 
Four years later, the Court applied the Bradenburg test in Hess 
v. Indiana,
120
 where it overturned the conviction of a defendant 
who declared, ―[w]e‘ll take the fucking street later,‖ to a crowd at 
an antiwar demonstration while the sheriff and deputies were 
attempting to clear the street.
121
  The Court held that the defendant 
could not be punished under Brandenburg because his words did 
not have ―a tendency to lead to violence,‖ primarily because they 
were not directed at a specific person or group of people and 
because they called for illegal action only ―at some indefinite, 
future time.‖122  This indicates that speech that is directed at 
particular individuals or a group and calls for illegal action at a 
specified time may pass the Brandenburg hurdle and can be 
subject to regulation, even if it does not tend to produce, or 
actually produce, immediate lawless action. 
D. Prior Restraint, Vagueness and Overbreadth, and the 
Difference Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Laws 
In its First Amendment speech jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has presumed the invalidity of laws that either restrict 
 
 116 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 443.  
 117 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 999. 
 118 See id. at 998–99. 
 119 See id. at 999–1000.  In relation to homicide committed in self-defense, the term 
―imminent danger‖ means ―immediate danger.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 
1990).   
 120 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 121 See id. at 106–07.  
 122 See id. at 108–09. 
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expression prior to its publication or are facially vague or 
overbroad.
123
  The Court has also differentiated between ―content-
based‖ and ―content-neutral‖ restrictions on speech, applying 
different levels of constitutional scrutiny in evaluating the validity 
of such laws.
124
  Content-based laws and regulations punish certain 
kinds of speech based on their subject matter or message.
125
  
Content-neutral restrictions regulate speech because the speech 
creates secondary effects, such as violence or immorality, or is 
being uttered in a proscribed time, place or manner.
126
 
1. Prior Restraint 
The Court has imposed a heavy presumption against the 
validity of laws that ban expression of ideas prior to their 
publication.
127
  In Near v. Minnesota, the Court struck down a state 
law that permitted public officials to seek an injunction to stop 
publication of any ―malicious, scandalous and defamatory 
newspaper, magazine or other periodical.‖128  The majority called 
the results of the law ―the essence of censorship‖ and declared it 
unconstitutional.
129
  While prior restraints are invalid, as a general 
matter, the restriction is not absolute; for example, the rule does 
not prevent governments from prohibiting publication of detailed 
information that would threaten national security in a time of 
war.
130
 
 
 123 See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
75.  
 124 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 932. 
 125 See id. at 936–39. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See generally Near, 283 U.S. 697. 
 128 Id. at 701. 
 129 Id. at 713. 
 130 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1979) (holding that 
―sanction[s] for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information‖ require the ―highest 
form of state interest to sustain . . . [their] validity,‖ and noting that ―prior restraints have 
been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases.‖); Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (―Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to 
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.‖). 
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2. Vagueness and Overbreadth 
The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are ―closely 
related‖ and laws that regulate speech are often challenged on both 
grounds.
131
  Both claims involve facial constitutional challenges to 
existing laws.
132
  However, it is important not to conflate the two 
concepts because while a law may be both vague and overbroad, it 
can also be overbroad, but not vague, or vague, but not 
overbroad.
133
  According to legal scholar Peter Poulos, ―the 
primary purposes of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are: 
(1) to prevent a ‗chilling effect‘ on generally innocent or 
constitutionally protected activity, and (2) to prevent the arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement of laws.‖134 
a) Unconstitutional Vagueness 
The vagueness doctrine ―emanates from the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . [and] 
requires[:] (1) that a law give people of ordinary intelligence notice 
of what is prohibited, and (2) that a law provide explicit standards 
to law enforcement officers in order to avoid arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.‖135 
A law that affects speech, therefore, is unconstitutionally vague 
if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech the law prohibits 
and what speech the law allows.
136  
Courts worry about possible 
chilling effects of too-vague laws on constitutionally protected 
 
 131  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 948. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Com‘rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) 
(finding a law restricting all First Amendment activity at an airport overbroad, but not 
vague). 
 134 Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago‟s Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of 
Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 383 (1995). 
 135 Id. at 382. 
 136 See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (explaining that a 
law is unconstitutionally vague if people ―of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application . . .‖); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983) (―As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.‖). 
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speech.
137
  In order to avoid being penalized for breaking the law, 
―some people may choose to limit the things they say and express 
to a higher degree than the law intended.‖138  The Court 
highlighted this concern in NAACP v. Button,
139
 where it held that 
narrow tailoring is necessary ―[b]ecause First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive.‖140  For example, in 
Smith v. Goguen,
141
 the Court held that a state law prohibiting 
―contemptuous‖ treatment of a flag was unconstitutionally vague 
because it ―fail[ed] to draw reasonably clear lines between the 
kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that 
are not.‖142  The Supreme Court has thus invalidated laws 
regulating speech on vagueness grounds when they are ―so 
ambiguous that the reasonable person cannot tell what expression 
is forbidden and what is allowed.‖143 
A law is also unconstitutionally vague if it does not prevent 
officers from arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforcing it.
144
  For 
example, in City of Houston v. Hill,
145
 the Court found 
unconstitutional a city ordinance that criminalized the interruption 
of police officers in the performance of their duties.
146
  The Court 
held that the law was not narrowly tailored to proscribe only 
disorderly conduct or fighting words, which likely would have 
made the ordinance constitutional.
147
  The Court instead found that 
the Houston law ―effectively grant[ed] police the discretion to 
make arrests selectively on the basis of the content of the 
speech.‖148 
In the context of criminal law, including a criminal intent 
requirement is one way to avoid invalidity due to vagueness.  If a 
 
 137 Dr. Jonathan Mott, Ph.D., First Amendment: Speech, THISNATION.COM, 
http://thisnation.com/textbook/ billofrights-speech.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 138 Id. 
 139 371 U.S. 415 (1963).  
 140 Id. at 432–33 (citations omitted). 
 141 415 U.S. 566 (1974).  
 142 Id. at 574. 
 143 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 942. 
 144 See Smith, 415 U.S. at 574.  
 145 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
 146 See id. 
 147 See id. at 482 n.15. 
 148 See id. 
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criminal statute or ordinance does not require criminal intent to 
qualify for punishment, it is likely to be deemed unconstitutionally 
vague.
149
  In City of Chicago v. Morales,
150
 the Court held that 
where vagueness permeates the text of a criminal law that 
―contains no mens rea requirement and infringes on 
constitutionally protected rights,‖ the law is subject to facial 
attack.
151
  The Supreme Court has thus recognized that ―the 
constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to 
whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.‖152 
Though there is no bright-line test to determine whether a law 
is unconstitutionally vague on its face, the Court has made it clear 
that speech-restrictive laws need to be narrowly drawn, and that 
they require particularly sharp precision in their language.
153
  
Statutes and ordinances can and will be invalidated unless they 
provide adequate notice to constituents of what is illegal and what 
is not.
154
 
b) Unconstitutional Overbreadth 
A law may also be invalidated on grounds of overbreadth.  A 
law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially 
more speech than the constitution permits to be regulated.
155
  The 
person raising an overbreadth claim need not be affected directly 
by the restriction; rather, a person to whom the law can be 
constitutionally applied can argue that the same law would be 
unconstitutional as applied to others.
156
  The doctrine provides that 
 
 149 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
 150 See id. 
 151 See id. at 55 (invalidating an ordinance that required a police officer, upon observing 
a person whom he reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member loitering in 
any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such persons to disperse, 
and made the failure to obey such an order promptly a violation of the ordinance, for 
unconstitutional vagueness). 
 152 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); see also United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434–46 (1978); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156, 163 (1972); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1952). 
 153 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 943. 
 154 See id. at 932. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (―Embedded in the 
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to 
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somebody ―whose speech is unprotected by the First Amendment 
and who could constitutionally be punished under a more narrow 
statute may argue that the law is [altogether overbroad] because of 
how it might be applied to third parties not before the Court.‖157 
For example, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting 
all live entertainment as overbroad in Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim.
158
  In that case, an adult bookstore that featured live nude 
dancers succeeded in challenging the ordinance, because it 
outlawed all live entertainment—not just nude dancing.159  The 
bookstore‘s claim was successful, in part, because of how the 
ordinance would regulate the constitutional speech of third persons 
not party to the case.
160
 
3. Content-Based Restrictions 
The Supreme Court has held that the core of First Amendment 
speech protection is the protection from government regulations 
based on the content of the speech.
161
  The Court has declared 
content-based regulations to be ―presumptively invalid.‖162  In 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission,
163
 the Court made clear that content-based 
regulations must meet strict scrutiny to be upheld, while content-
neutral regulations need only meet intermediate scrutiny.
164
  The 
Turner Court explained that ―[g]overnment action that stifles 
speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a 
particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this 
essential [First Amendment] right‖ and continued by noting that 
 
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute 
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other 
situations not before the Court.‖). 
 157 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 943–44. 
 158 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
 159 See id. at 73.  
 160 See id. at 66.  
 161 See Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 162 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 882 (1992).  
 163 512 U.S. 662 (1994).  
 164 See id.; see also United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 
(2000) (―We have made clear that the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the 
secondary effects of crime or declining property values has no application to content-
based regulations targeting the primary effects of protected speech.‖).  
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the First Amendment ―does not countenance governmental control 
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.‖165 
In order to survive strict scrutiny, content-based speech 
restrictions must be ―narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.‖166  Only a few specifically defined categories of content-
based speech are unprotected or less protected by the First 
Amendment
167
: incitement (as defined by the Court in 
Brandenburg), illegal activity, obscenity,
168
 child pornography,
169
 
and defamation.
170
 
a) Content and Viewpoint Neutrality 
In order to constitutionally regulate speech, government laws 
may not discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.
171
  
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in First 
Amendment speech cases is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys.
172
  A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental 
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.
173
  In United 
States v. O‟Brien,174 the Court established a four-factor test to 
 
 165 Id. at 641.  
 166 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); Burson 
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 
(1988) (plurality); Bd. of Airport Comm‘rs  of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 
573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry 
Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
167    See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 933. 
168  The modern test regarding obscenity is ―whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to prurient interest.‖ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
169   Unprotected child pornography involves ―works that visually depict sexual conduct 
by children below a specified age.‖ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 170  To be classified as unprotected defamation, the First Amendment requires that a 
defamation plaintiff prove actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth when the 
plaintiff is a public official or public figure. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). 
 171 See First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978); see also 1 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:5 (3d ed. 1996). 
 172 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).  
 173 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989).  
 174 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
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determine the constitutionality of content-neutral speech 
restrictions:  
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of 
government; [2] if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression, and [4] if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.
175
  
Later, a fifth factor was added in City of Ladue v. Gilleo
176
: 
whether the restriction ―leave[s] open ample alternative channels 
for communication.‖177  The current test, akin to an ―intermediate 
scrutiny‖ analysis, can be articulated as follows: government 
regulation of expression is deemed content-neutral if it can be 
―justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech‖ 
and is ―narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest,‖ while leaving open ―ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.‖178  Content-neutral 
regulations, therefore, are evaluated under an ―intermediate 
scrutiny‖ analysis.  This means that the government cannot 
regulate speech based on its viewpoint or subject unless the 
regulation passes strict scrutiny.
179
 
However, the Supreme Court has indicated that a regulation 
that is facially content-based may be deemed content-neutral if it is 
motivated by a permissible content-neutral purpose.
180
  In Renton 
v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,
181
 the Court upheld an ordinance that 
prohibited adult movie theaters from being located within 1,000 
feet of certain designated areas.
182
  Though the ordinance was 
content-based on its face as it applied only to those theaters that 
 
 175 See id. at 377.   
 176 512 U.S. 43 (1994).  
 177 See id. at 56 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).  
 178 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
 179 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).  
 180 Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 181 Id. 
 182 See id. 
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showed adult films, the Court treated the regulation as content-
neutral because the government was motivated by a desire to 
control the secondary effects of the existence of these theaters, 
such as crime, and not a desire to control the speech itself.
183
  Thus 
Renton clarified that courts must look at the justification of the 
law, and not its plain terms, when making content-neutrality 
determinations.
184
 
b) Public Forums and the Time, Place, or Manner Test 
Time, place, or manner restrictions are a type of content-
neutral speech regulation.
185
  The concept of time, place, or 
manner restrictions refers to the government‘s ability to regulate 
speech in a public forum in a manner that minimizes disruption of 
a public space while still protecting First Amendment speech.
186
  
The Court in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc.
187
 held that reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions are valid ―provided that they are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.‖188  For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative 
Non-Violence,
189
 the Court upheld a federal regulation that 
prohibited sleeping in certain national parks over the objections of 
protesters who had camped out in a national park to draw attention 
 
 183 See id. at 48.  
 184 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 937.  The author notes that the holding in 
Renton has been strongly criticized by commentators because it ―permits an end run 
around the First Amendment: The government can always point to some neutral, non-
speech justification for its actions.‖  Indeed, the Court has distinguished Renton in 
subsequent cases.  
185    See generally 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 828. 
 186 See id. at 1131.  
 187 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 188 Id. at 648 (upholding a regulation at the Minnesota State Fair that prohibited the 
distribution of literature or the soliciting of funds except at booths.  The regulation was 
content-neutral because all literature and solicitations were regulated regardless of 
speaker, viewpoint, or subject-matter.  The governmental purpose was justified because 
of its important interest in controlling pedestrian traffic at the fair.  Finally, the Court 
found that the Krishna had alternate ways to reach the fair‘s attendees, both off grounds 
and at the fair booths.). 
 189 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
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to the plight of the homeless.
190
  The Court found that the 
regulation was not aimed at suppressing symbolic speech, because 
it applied to everyone in the park, and not just the protesters 
involved in the case.
191
  The Court further noted that the regulation 
was reasonably designed to further the substantial government 
interest in conserving the national parks, a public space, by 
minimizing the wear and tear that can be caused by campers.
192
  
Finally, the Court found that it was a valid time, place, or manner 
regulation because sleeping in the park was not banned generally, 
but only prohibited in certain designated areas.
193
 
Time, place or manner restrictions give the government the 
power ―to regulate speech in a public forum in a manner that 
minimizes disruption of public place while still protecting freedom 
of speech.‖194  Time, place, and manner restrictions accommodate 
public convenience and promote order by regulating for example, 
noise,
195
 flow of pedestrian traffic,
196
 speech activities within 100 
feet of the entrance to any healthcare facility,
197
 and 
demonstrations within 15 feet of doorways, parking lot entrances, 
and driveways.
198
  The Court has held that nobody may ―insist 
upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush 
hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly.‖199  
Time restrictions regulate ―whether the manner of expression is 
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time.‖200  Manner restrictions impact how 
speech can be delivered; for example, regulating the volume of the 
 
 190 See id. at 288.  
 191 See id. at 298. 
 192 See id. at 299. 
 193 See id. at 295.  
 194 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1131.   
 195 See id. at 107–08.  
 196 See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654. 
 197 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 198 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 199 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554–55 (1965) (stating that ―Governmental 
authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for 
movement.‖). 
 200 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
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particular presentation.
201
 Place restrictions regulate where 
individuals may express themselves. The Court has recognized 
three forums of public expression: traditional public forums, 
―designated‖ public forums, and nonpublic forums.202 
Traditional public forums are government properties that have 
historically been available for the dissemination of information and 
the communication of ideas, such as municipal streets and parks.
203
  
Under First Amendment doctrine, the government may not close 
traditional public forums to speech, but may place reasonable 
restrictions on their use.
204
  The government may, however, 
regulate speech in public forums under certain circumstances;
205
 
but a content-based regulation still must pass strict scrutiny.
206
 
Importantly, the Court has ruled that government regulation of 
speech in traditional public forums need not use the least 
restrictive alternative, but the restriction must always be narrowly 
tailored to the ―government‘s legitimate, content-neutral 
interests.‖207 
Designated, or limited, public forums are ―place[s] that the 
government could close to speech, but that the government 
voluntarily, affirmatively opens to speech.‖208  The Court has held, 
for example, that public schools and universities can become 
limited public forums if they allow student and community groups 
 
201  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Lambe, The Structure of Censorship Attitudes, 13 COMM. L. & 
POL‘Y 485, 490 (2008); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyrights Fair Use 
Doctrince as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
31, 52 n.94 (2007).  
 202 See Int‘l Soc‘y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992) 
(holding an airport operated by the Port Authority is a non-public forum, and therefore 
the Port Authority‘s ban on solicitation there need only satisfy a reasonableness 
standard). 
 203 See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 841 (2011). 
 204 See Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
 205 See id. 
 206 See id. 
 207 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (upholding a New 
York City requirement that any concert using the Central Park Naumburg Bandshell had 
to use city sound engineers and equipment, despite the fact that the city could have 
achieved its goal of noise reduction through a less-restrictive means, such as limits on 
decibel levels). 
 208 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1137. 
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to use their property.
209
  As long as the government chooses to 
allow speech in such a place, the rules regarding traditional public 
forums apply.
210
 
The third category—non-public forums—consists of those 
―government properties that the government can close to all speech 
activities.‖211  Airline terminals, 212 the area outside jailhouses,213 
and military bases
214
 have all been deemed nonpublic forums 
under the First Amendment.  A lower level of scrutiny is applied 
when the regulation involves a non-public forum because the 
government may constitutionally prohibit or restrict speech in non-
public forums ―so long as the regulation is reasonable and 
viewpoint-neutral.‖215 
II. HOW TO EFFECTIVELY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY REDUCE FLASH 
MOB VIOLENCE: CONTENT-BASED VERSUS CONTENT-NEUTRAL 
LAWS 
It is clear that local governments must act in order to prevent 
and penalize the organization of criminal flash mobs.  Two 
possible ways to regulate violent and criminal flash mobs are: (1) 
content-based laws that prohibit the speech that incites mobs, and 
(2) content-neutral laws, such as curfews, that target speech only 
secondarily. 
A. Regulations Related to Content of Flash Mob Advocacy 
Messages 
Content-based laws aimed at regulating digital speech that 
incites flash mobs would be evaluated under the Brandenburg test.  
To avoid being deemed unconstitutional, such laws would need to 
be drafted with particularity to avoid vagueness and overbreadth. 
1. Laws Regulating Incitement Speech Must Pass the 
 
 209 See id. 
 210 See id. 
 211 See id. at 1139. 
 212 See Int‘l Soc‘y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). 
 213 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). 
 214 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836–37 (1976). 
 215 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1139. 
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Brandenburg Test 
In order to pass constitutional muster, any law that regulates 
the incitement of flash mobs would have to meet the requirements 
set out in Brandenburg, that the speech ―is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.‖216  First, the Brandenburg test would require 
the speaker to have intended to incite an ―imminent‖ criminal flash 
mob.  The imminence requirement is a temporal one, but need not 
be interpreted as ―immediacy.‖217  Rather, ―imminence‖ can be 
understood to mean ―predictability.‖218  If flexibly applied, the 
Brandenburg test merely requires the regulated speech to be 
directed at inciting lawlessness at a concrete, predictable time.
219
  
Second, a law would have to be very clear about the type of speech 
that is likely to incite or produce such action.  Under such a law, a 
speaker would not be punished for inciting a flash mob unless the 
mob occurred, was violent or criminal in nature, and at least one 
person was arrested for committing a crime associated with the 
mob. 
2. Avoiding Vagueness and Overbreadth 
To avoid failure for vagueness or overbreadth, and to meet the 
first prong of the Brandenburg test, a content-based regulation of 
flash mob speech would require evidence of criminal intent.  For 
example, in order to punish the speech, a showing of actual intent 
―to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action,‖220 such as 
larceny or vandalism, would be required. 
 
 216 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 217 See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative 
Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1994). 
 218 See id. (―If imminence were interpreted instead to mean simply the immediacy in 
time of the result, the Brandenburg test would not make sense.  We should no more 
regard the First Amendment as an excuse for a contract murder, for example, merely 
because the conspirators scheduled it for a future date, than we should excuse a murder 
accomplished by a time bomb.  The time bomb causes ―imminent‖ harm in the sense that 
once it is triggered, harm is highly likely and closely related.  So does the contract 
murder.  To read Brandenburg otherwise would be to reach a result that the Supreme 
Court could not possibly have intended.‖). 
 219 See id. 
 220 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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A constitutional regulation would require the speech to contain 
an explicit delineation of the time and place of the planned flash 
mob in order to be punishable.  The email, social media message, 
or text message in question must contain particular, predetermined 
―tip off‖ words to demonstrate criminal intent, such as ―rob,‖ 
―loot,‖ ―rage,‖ ―attack,‖ or ―mayhem,‖ and may not be as general 
or innocuous as ―gathering,‖ ―meeting,‖ or ―party.‖ 
 The statutory language of a flash mob law must also be very 
specific about types of speech and social media that will be subject 
to the regulation in order to provide adequate notice to potential 
violators and to protect against unlimited and arbitrary police 
discretion.  A constitutional ordinance would require a clear listing 
of devices and means by which potential violators broadcast their 
message.  For example, a law could proscribe calls for flash mobs 
made via email, social media message, blog post, text message, 
BlackBerry message, or Twitter. 
 In order to provide notice to potential violators and to provide 
clear guidance for law enforcement, a constitutional regulation 
must have specific application criteria.  Flash mob participants 
would only be subject to punishment for speech organizing the 
mob if one or more persons were arrested for crimes committed as 
part of the mob.  A law might also include a minimum number of 
people summoned to qualify as a flash mob.  For example, a 
speech-restrictive law could require that a message be distributed 
to at least four people before triggering the flash mob law. 
A law must clearly provide the penalties associated with its 
violation.  A successful content-based ordinance would categorize 
violations as misdemeanors, and would impose only fines as 
punishment, in order to be attractive to local legislatures. 
Thus the law must be specific about he speaker‘s intent, what 
language is included in the messages, the means by which those 
messages can be sent, the particular characteristics of the mob and 
mob activity, and what the penalties are for engaging in flash mob 
incitement. 
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3. Examples of Content-Based Regulations 
The Cleveland, Ohio city council recently sponsored a proposal 
for a content-based regulation that aims to punish the use of social 
media to organize unlawful flash mob activity.
221
  Additionally, 
Great Britain‘s Prime Minister David Cameron has voiced a 
possible need for similar legislation in reaction to the recent flash 
mob riots in London.
222
 
a) Cleveland 
The Cleveland city council approved a flash mob ordinance in 
July 2011; however in August 2011, Mayor Frank Jackson vetoed 
the law.
223
  He cited several constitutional issues, including the 
danger of overbreadth, because ―it would impact law-abiding 
citizens and wrongdoers alike.‖224  Mayor Jackson was also 
concerned about the ―vague definition of ‗social media.‘‖225  The 
July law would have prohibited the ―improper use of social media 
to violate ordinances on disorderly conduct, public intoxication 
and unlawful congregation by promoting illegal flash mob 
activity.‖226  First offense violations ―would have resulted in a 
misdemeanor charge and a fine of $100.‖227 
In a second effort to enforce a flash mob law, the city council 
proposed an amended set of ordinances, the goal of which was to 
expand existing city laws so that people who use technology to 
 
 221 See Zack Reed & Jeff Johnson, Opposing View: Stop Criminal Flash Mobs, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 15, 2011, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/ 
2011-09-14/flash-mobs-Cleveland-ordinance/50406092/1. 
 222 See J. David Goodman, In British Riots, Social Media and Face Masks are the 
Focus, LEDE (Aug. 11, 2011), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/social-media-
and-facemasks-are-targets-after-british-riots. 
 223 See Cleveland: “Flash Mob” Law Vetoed by Mayor Jackson, WKYC.COM (Aug. 4, 
2011), http://www.wkyc.com/news/article/200798/3/Cleveland-Flash-mob-law-vetoed-
by-Mayor-Jackson. 
 224 See id. 
 225 See Amanda Garrett, Mayor Frank Jackson Quashes New Social Media Ordinance 
Aimed at Killing Flash Mobs, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 4, 2011), http://blog.cleveland.com 
/metro/2011/08/mayor_ 
frank_jackson_quashes_ne.html. 
 226 Cleveland: “Flash Mob” Law Vetoed by Mayor Jackson, supra note 221. 
 227 Id. 
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create a public disturbance can be held accountable.
228
  
Councilman Jeffrey Johnson stated, ―we want to send a message 
from Cleveland City Council beginning tonight that those who 
organize criminal flash mobs, that we‘re not only going to respond 
to you, but we‘re going to prosecute you.‖ 229  Councilman 
Michael D. Polensek said, ―[w]e‘ve been able to fashion three 
pieces that tighten up various definitions within the codified 
ordinances. We want to make the police have a little bit more 
power in their effort to deal with the potential flash mob 
situations.‖230  But Mayor Jackson refused to sign the law because 
he believed that it mirrored existing state law and would not 
change how flash mobs are regulated.
231
  However, because the 
mayor took no affirmative action to approve or veto the law, a 
provision of the city charter permitted the council‘s ordinance to 
become law.
232
 
Three components of the new law are: 
[1] Inciting to riot.  No person shall knowingly 
engage in conduct designed to incite another to 
commit a riot.  This supplement ordinance targets 
the individual(s) who organize a riot and would be a 
misdemeanor of the first degree. 
[2] Riot.  No person shall participate with four or 
more others in a course of disorderly conduct in 
violation of Section 605.03,
233
 including but not 
limited to a community event, place of business, or 
any City of Cleveland property, facility, or 
 
 228 See Jessica Dabrowski, Cleveland Councilmen Take Another Shot at Flash Mobs, 
FOX 8 CLEVELAND (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.fox8.com/news/wjw-flash-mob-
ordinances-city-council-jd-txt,0,2014818.story. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Pat Galbincea, Flash Mob Ordinances Become Law in Cleveland Minus Mayor 
Frank Jackson‟s Signature, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 13, 2011), http://blog.cleveland.com/ 
metro/2011/12/flash_mob_ordinances_become_la.html. 
 232 See id. 
233 This ordinance outlines acts that constitute disorderly conduct, a minor 
misdemeanor.  CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 605, § 605.03 (2006), 
available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Ohio/cleveland_oh/ 
codifiedordinancesofthecityofcleveland?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:cl
eveland_oh. 
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recreation area.  This amending ordinance focuses 
on the individuals participating in a riot and would 
be a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
[3] Criminal tool.  This ordinance includes 
―electronic media device‖ as part of the listing of 
criminal tools under section 625.08
234
 of the 
Codified Ordinances of Cleveland.  This amending 
ordinance would be a misdemeanor of the first 
degree.
235
 
Councilman Jeffrey Johnson argues that the new approach is 
constitutional because it ―does not find fault in the use of social 
media to express an opinion, but rather considers the organizer‘s 
words as proof of criminal intent.‖236  James Hardiman, legal 
director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, whose 
group has opposed both flash mob ordinances, said ―he would have 
preferred Jackson to veto the ordinances because ‗it will cause 
more problems than it will ever solve.‘‖237  He added concerns 
about the potential for illegal police searches and seizures and 
discrimination as ―the law will target minorities.‖238 
b) London 
Young rioters in the United Kingdom have utilized 
Blackberry‘s Messenger Service (―BBM‖) to organize flash 
mobs.
239
  One BBM broadcast sent during riots in the city in 
 
234   This ordinance lists and defines criminal tools. CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE OF 
ORDINANCES ch. 625, § 625.08 (2011), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/ 
gateway.dll/Ohio/cleveland_oh/codifiedordinancesofthecityofcleveland?f=templates$fn=
default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:cleveland_oh.   
 235 Jen Steer, New Cleveland City Council Proposal Pushes for Ban on Flash Mobs . . . 
Again, NEWSNET5.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/local_ 
news/cleveland_metro/New-Cleveland-City-Council-proposal-pushes-for-ban-on-flash-
mobs-again. 
 236 Anita Ramasastry, To Honor First Amendment Rights, Cleveland and Other Cities 
Should Focus on Flash Mob Violence, Not Instant Messaging, JUSTIA.COM (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/10/11/to-honor-first-amendment-rights-cleveland-
and-other-cities-should-focus-on-flash-mob-violence-not-instant-messaging. 
 237 Galbincea, supra note 229. 
 238 Id. 
 239 See Olivia Solon, Why Has BlackBerry Been Blamed for the London Riots?, 
WIRED.CO.UK (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-08/09/why-are-
we-blaming-bbm-for-riots. 
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August of 2010 read, ―Everyone from all sides of London meet up 
at the heart of London (central) OXFORD CIRCUS!!, Bare 
SHOPS are gonna get smashed up so come get some (free stuff!!!) 
f**k the feds we will send them back with OUR riot! >:O Dead the 
ends and colour war for now so if you see a brother... SALUT! if 
you see a fed... SHOOT!.‖240  BBM activity occurs on a closed 
network, making it nearly impossible for officials to monitor.
241
  
British Prime Minister David Cameron is considering ways to give 
British police ―the technology to trace people on Twitter or BBM 
or close it down.‖242  In response to the proliferation of riots in 
London, Cameron said he was working with police to consider 
laws banning rioters from using social media, considering 
―whether it would be right to stop people communicating via these 
websites and services when we know they are plotting violence, 
disorder, and criminality.‖243  Such regulations, if passed in the 
United States, would likely fall into the category of prior restraints 
and content-based restrictions. 
B. Content-Neutral Regulations Aimed at Containing Violence 
and Criminal Riots: Time, Place and Manner Restrictions 
The Supreme Court has stated, ―regulations that are unrelated 
to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of 
scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of 
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.‖244  
Time, place, and manner restrictions are constitutional if ―they are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
 
240  Keith Lee, Flash Mob Riots: Crime in the Age of Twitter, LEXIS HUB FOR NEW 
ATTORNEYS (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/lexishub/blogs/legal 
technologyandsocialmedia/archive/2011/08/09/flash-mob-riots-crime-in-the-age-of-
twitter.aspx. 
 241 See id. BlackBerry automatically encrypts messages sent to another person‘s 
BlackBerry when using their PIN—this means that the messages cannot be intercepted by 
a government or mobile network. Id. 
 242 Olivia Solon, U.K. Prime Minister Suggests „Pre-Crime‟ Blocking of Social Media, 
WIRED (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/08/uk-block-social-media. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
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communication of the information.‖245  Two types of time, place 
and manner restrictions could target flash mobs—curfews and 
permit requirements.   
1. Curfews 
 Local governments have the option of imposing curfews for 
minors as a means of deterring flash mob violence by teenagers.  A 
curfew law would be justified if it would decrease the likelihood of 
violence in the city in a way that does not discriminate based on 
expression of speech.  A curfew would need to qualify as 
significantly related to the government‘s interest in curbing 
violence and criminal activity, which could be proved through use 
of statistics relating to nighttime teen crime prevalence.
246
  Finally, 
because a curfew law would only proscribe gatherings after a 
particular hour, such a law would leave open ample alternative 
times for communication of flash mob expression. 
 The mayor of Philadelphia recently enacted curfew 
requirements for teenagers
247
 and Silver Spring, Maryland officials 
are considering doing the same in an effort to curb teen loitering 
and the proliferation of criminal flash mob activity.
248
   
Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter responded to flash mob 
violence with measures including establishing a 9:00pm curfew for 
teenagers on Friday and Saturdays in parts of the city.
249
  Nutter 
emphasized the need to punish young mob participants, as well as 
their parents.
250
  Under the law, police will initially issue warnings 
to parents whose teenagers break the curfew.
251
  After a warning 
 
 245 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
246    Flash mobs are heavily associated with black teenagers. See Patrik Jonsson, Flash 
Mob Attacks: Rising Concern Over Black Teen Involvement, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0809/Flash-mob-attacks-Rising-
concern-over-black-teen-involvement. 
 247 See Elizabeth Fiedler, Officials in Phila. Plan Curfews to Curb Teen Violence, NPR 
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/11/139507252/officials-in-phila-plan-
curfews-to-curb-teen-violence. 
 248 See Katie Kindelan, Flash Mob Raids 7-11 Store in Silver Spring, Maryland, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/11/flash-mob-raids-
7-11-store-in-silver-spring-maryland. 
 249 See Fiedler, supra note 242. 
 250 See id. 
 251 See id. 
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has already been provided, the city will issue fines up to $500.
252
  
Nutter said in response to the fine, ―I don‘t care what your 
economic status is in life, you do not have a right to beat 
somebody‘s ass on the street.‖253  In September 2011, Mayor 
Nutter announced that he would continue to enforce the curfew 
because it has been successful; there have been no flash mob 
incidents since its inception in early August.
254
 
 Additionally, following the violent incidents that prompted the 
curfew, Philadelphia police have increased patrols.
255
  The city is 
also working with the FBI to track criminal use of social media
256
 
and Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey has been 
communicating with other law enforcement superintendents 
around the county, brainstorming about other ideas to address this 
type of criminal conduct.
257
 
 Silver Spring officials proposed enacting ―countywide bills that 
would enforce a curfew and attempt to curb suspicious 
loitering.‖258  Those who support the bills think that ―the use of a 
curfew would be an effective way to keep teens from causing 
mayhem or misbehaving in the evening,‖ suggesting that those 
under the age of seventeen be off the streets by 11:00 p.m. on 
weekdays and by midnight on weekends.
259
  The proposed 
loitering bill would prohibit people from remaining ―in a public 
place or establishment at a time or in a manner not usual for law-
abiding persons under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and 
reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons in 
the vicinity.‖260 
 
 252 See id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 See Kelly Bayliss, No End to Teen Curfew, NBC 10 PHILA. (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/No-End-to-Teen-Curfew-129648373.html. 
 255 See Fiedler, supra note 242. 
 256 See Timpane, supra note 13. 
 257 Fiedler, supra note 242. 
 258 A Flash Mob of 50 Tricky Teenagers Robs 7-Eleven, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2064735/7-Eleven-robbed-flash-mob-50-tricky-
teenagers-Silver-Spring-Maryland.html#ixzz1eRnZK9yh. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
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2. Permit Requirements 
Governments also have the option to require permits in order to 
conduct activities on public grounds.  A permit requirement law 
would be justified if it would decrease the likelihood of criminal 
flash mobs on public grounds without reference to flash-mob-
related speech.   A permit requirement would need to qualify as 
significantly related to the government‘s interest in curbing 
violence and criminal activity, which could be proved through use 
of statistics relating to the prevalence of criminal or violent activity 
on public grounds.  Finally, because a permit law would only 
proscribe gatherings on public grounds without a permit, such a 
law would leave open ample alternatives for communication of 
flash mob expression on private grounds, as well as on public 
grounds if the permit is granted. 
The town of Braunschweig, Germany has a permit requirement 
in place to allow for police review of plans for activity on public 
grounds.
261
  The city recently increased its enforcement of an 
existing law requiring permits for events on public grounds due to 
flash mobs.
262
  When permits are not secured, local law 
enforcement officials often station themselves in locations where 
they expect flash mobs to take place in order to prevent 
participation.
263
  As an alternative to physically stopping them, the 
police attempt to establish contact with flash mob organizers ahead 
of time to avoid surprise and to cancel the event peacefully.
264
 
In 2009, German artist Dirk Schadt organized a flash mob 
picnic at the city‘s central square, when a local office of the public 
order contacted him to tell him it is illegal to conduct such an event 
without a city permit.
265
  The government office learned of 
Schadt‘s plan when an employee monitored a flash mob group on a 
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social networking site.
266
  The official requested Schadt‘s email 
address from the website and contacted Schadt to tell him that his 
event would not be allowed.
267
  A government official later noted 
that had Schadt gotten a permit, police intervention could have 
been avoided entirely.
268
 
III. CONTENT-BASED LAWS WILL BEST SERVE GOVERNMENT 
GOALS OF DETERRING CRIMINAL AND VIOLENT FLASH MOBS 
Content-based regulations punishing the speaker who incites a 
criminal flash mob will be more effective in deterring and 
controlling violence and crime than content-neutral laws such as 
curfews and permit requirements.  Content-neutral laws do not 
target the root of the problem, and curfew and permit laws are easy 
to circumvent.  Carefully written content-based regulations will 
specifically punish and deter the creation of violent, criminal flash 
mobs without proscribing other, unrelated activities in the way that 
time, place and manner regulations would.  Utilizing a carefully 
drafted content-based flash mob regulation, it is possible to pass 
the Brandenburg test and avoid penalizing those who incite and 
participate in ―good‖ flash mobs, like those associated with the 
Arab Spring.  An example of such an ordinance is included below. 
A. Content-Neutral Laws will Not Target the Real Problem 
Neither curfew laws nor permit requirements address the heart 
of the problem of criminal flash mobs.  While curfew laws may 
limit criminal flash mobs composed of children under the statutory 
age and after the curfew time, they will not curb crime among 
those above age or those participating in mobs before the curfew 
time.  ―Flash robs‖ are not always conducted by minors and are not 
always conducted at night.
269
  Moreover, curfew laws are subject 
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to intermediate scrutiny, and may be found impermissibly vague.  
Curfew laws are also often the target of equal protection and 
substantive due process claims. 
Similarly, permit requirements are problematic because they 
only affect flash mobs set to occur on public grounds.  Because 
many of the criminal flash mobs are robberies, they occur in 
shopping malls and private stores, areas that would not be subject 
to the permit restrictions. 
B. “Good Flash Mobs” Need Not Be Criminalized 
 In light of recent political and social revolution in the 
Middle East, flash mob speech laws may be criticized for 
punishing the organization of all such events, without 
differentiating between those mobs formed to commit robberies, 
commit vandalism, or disturb the peace and those mobs formed to 
protest dictatorships, corrupt governments, and human rights 
violations.  A way around this problem is to distinguish between 
politically motivated, subversive advocacy speech that, while often 
tending to promote violence, is spoken in order to promote 
political ideals and to organize protests, and incitement speech that 
is spoken for the purpose of inciting random, malicious criminal 
behavior. 
C. A Proposed Constitutional Ordinance 
 The following language may be used by state and local 
governments to address the current trend in violent and criminal 
flash mob activity, while remaining in line with the Supreme 
Court‘s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
Inciting a criminal flash mob. No person shall 
knowingly engage in conduct designed to incite 
another to participate in a criminal flash mob. This 
ordinance targets only those individual(s) arrested 
for another crime or crimes committed as part of a 
criminal flash mob and who organized such mob by 
sending a message via an electronic media device or 
outlet including, but not limited to, SMS, Facebook, 
BlackBerry Messenger, and Twitter, specifically 
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calling for the recipients to ―rob,‖ ―loot,‖ ―rage,‖ 
―attack,‖ ―riot,‖ or engage in ―mayhem‖ at a 
specified date, time, and place.  The act of inciting a 
criminal flash mob is a misdemeanor of the first 
degree. 
Criminal flash mob: Defined. A planned gathering 
of five or more people engaging in disorderly and/or 
criminal conduct, including but not limited to 
burglary, larceny, vandalism, arson, and battery, 
organized via electronic device or social media 
platform and with the primary purpose of 
committing crimes, misdemeanors, and/or 
disturbing community peace. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the gravity of, and spike in, the number of criminal 
flash mobs in United States cities, local governments must be 
allowed to regulate the speech that ignites them.  Content-neutral 
laws, such as youth curfews and permit requirements, may result in 
a temporary decrease in crime, but such laws are easy to maneuver 
around and will not get to the root of a growing problem.  Instead, 
lawmakers should punish the incitement of criminal flash mobs 
through carefully drafted ordinances that assign liability only if 
one or more persons have been arrested for other flash mob-related 
crimes.  Laws that require intent to incite a criminal flash mob, 
predictability of the flash mob‘s occurrence, and the criminal flash 
mob‘s actual occurrence will survive Brandenburg scrutiny and 
minimize chilling effects on free speech.  Such content-based laws 
will best serve the government‘s goal of deterring flash mob crime 
in that they will directly target and penalize those who start those 
mobs that actually result in criminal activity.  It is important that 
governments stay within the limits of the longstanding and 
carefully developed First Amendment jurisprudence, and it is 
imperative that they take action to control and deter the violent, 
criminal behavior that is plaguing our cities. 
 
